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Case 'No.: 7175 
· · In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
)~~EWEL J. OLSON; ope(ating un~er 
,,~~the a.~~u_med nam~ ·of NEWEL J. 
(··OLSON -& SONS, ) 
~laintiff and Appellant, \ . 
/.. 
Defendant an¢ Respondent. 
) 
,...._._.,_ _____________ , _ _ 
~: > · f9R!, fUPR£11E COURT. UTtg 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
NEWEL J. OLSON, operating under 
the assumed name of NE\VEL J. 
OLSON & SONS; 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
ROLAND A. REESE, 
Defendant and Respond2nt. 
Case No. 7175 
Petition for Rehearing 
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH: 
( ·omes now the defendant in the above entitled cause 
and moves this Court to grant a rehearing of the above 
entitled cause upon the following grounds 
l. That the Court erred in its opinion heretofore written 
in holding that the trial court erred in sustaining the general 
demurrer and di~mio::c:ing the case :1nd in reversing the judgment 
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of dismissal and the order sustaining the demurrer and in 
remanding the cause for a new trial and in permitting the 
parties to amend their pleadings. 
2. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court 
erred in not permitting the plaintiff to amend his pleadings 
for the reason that the plaintiff never requested leave to amend 
and this in the face of the fact that the trial court specifically 
pointed out to him during the trial wherein his complaint 
failed to state a cause of action, particularly advising him the 
necessary allegation it should have contained, and this not-
withstanding plaintiff had a period of forty days in which to 
do so. These facts the Court apparently overlooked in arriving 
at its decision. 
3. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court 
erred for doing something the complaining party never asked 
it to do, and for something which the complaining party never 
himself attempted to 'remedy, that is a request for leave to 
amend his pleadings. 
4. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court 
erred in refusing to admit the introduction of evidence after 
it became known that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause 
of action. 
5. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court 
erred in refusing to permit the plaintiff time in which to 
present authorities on the question of the general demurrer 
in view of the fact that the trial court itself had specifically 
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pointed out \vherein the plaintiff had failed to state a cause 
of action. 
6. That the Court erred in assuming that the trial Court 
was so firm in his conviction that plaintiff could not state a 
cause of action or prove a case under any circumstances, and 
tlut it would have been futile for him to have requested any 
other or further consideration. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that a rehearing 
be granted, that the errors above mentioner be corrected, and 
that the order of this court reversing the judgment of dismissal 
of the lower court be vacated and withdrawn. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Atto1'neys for Defendant and Respondent. 
L. DELOS DAINES hereby certifies that -he is one of the , 
attorneys for the defendant and respondent in the-- above 
entitled cause; that in his opinion there is merit to the alleged 
errors in the majority opinion heretofore written in the above 
entitled cause. 
L DELOS -DAINES-
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ARGUMENT 
We are mindful that in the great majority of cases after the 
Court has considered the cause, no useful purpose can be 
accomplished by reargument of matters decided by the Court. 
However, in this- case we believe that as the Court apparently 
overlooked the following facts in arriving at its decision, that 
the Court will welcome a reconsideration thereof. The facts 
are these: 
That no_~wit?standing the trial court pointed out to the 
plaintiff partiq1~arly wherein his complaint was fatally defec-
tive, he neverthe!ess during the trial or during the period 
elapsing between the oral order of dismissal and the formal 
entry of the judgment, failed to request or ask leave of the 
Court to amend his pleadings. A period of forty days expired 
between the date of the oral order of dismissal and the 
-formal entry of the judgment. (Tr. 38A and 43). Further-
more, the plaintiff became aware prior to his appeal that 
the formal entry of judgment had not been entered, for after'he 
had served a notice of appeal on the 22nd day of March, 
1948, (Tr. 38C) he abandoned the appeal and then served 
a notice of appeal on the 30th day of March, 1948, the notice 
_ upon which this appeal is based, after the Court had entered 
iti judgment on the_ same day._ (Tr. 38.A and 38D). 
During the trial, the Court said: 
·' * * * _On this point the Court will-_ sustain the de· 
murrer that has been filed upon the grounds and for 
the reason that as _a condition precedent to the bringing 
of an· action, ot to the stating of a ·canse of action, that 
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the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was 
at the time of the undertaking a licensed contr~ctor in 
the State of Utah and that the proof must . show that 
allegation. I hate this matter to go off on a demurrer.'' 
(Tr. 89). 
Then in view of the fact that the plaintiff knew wherein 
his complaint was fatally defective, as the Court had so advised 
him, why is he now in a position to complain of his failure 
to take steps to amend his complaint, which he could have 
done either at the time of the trial or within the period 
expiring between the oral date of dismissal and the formal 
entry of judgment upon leave of the Court. Theie is no 
reason to believe the Court would not have granted such a 
request. 
The record further discloses that the trial court granted 
the plaintiff every reasonable consideration and request made. 
It allowed him to amend his complaint, (Tr. 43 and 44), and 
it granted his motion to vacate the order of . dismissal which 
was made when plaintiff failed to appear and prosecute his 
cause at its prior setting on June 6, 1948. (Tr. 30 and 38). 
Furthermore, we believe that in the light of the prior 
considerations granted the plaintiff that the Court would have 
granted him leave to amend his pleadings to state a cause 
of action on request as the Court has befo~e- stated -said: .. 1 
hate thfs matter to go off on a demurrer." Especially, had 
plaintiff taken the tim:e, the effort . and the • consideration to 
advise the trial court that he could state a ·cause of action, 
pointing out to him that the authorities as inenti~ned by the 
Court in its opinion are practically unari.imoiis to the effect 
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that the true date of the execution and delivery of the contract, 
regardless of the fact that it differs from the date shown in 
the contract, may be shown by parol evidence, and had given 
the Court the benefit of the citations mentioned in the Court's 
opinion. Plaintiff owed the Court this consideration. He had 
forty days in which to do so. 
Again we can see no error m the Court refusing to 
proceed with the trial and admitting the introduction of further 
testimony after it became apparent to the Court that plaintiff 
had failed to state ·a cause of action or to grant him time in 
which to present authorities on the question of the general 
demurrer; fo(is not the stating of a cause of action necessary 
to the Court's jurisdiction of the subject matter? And then 
ther~ would be no reason for the plaintiff to present authorities 
on .. the question of the general demurrer as the Court had 
-pointed out to him wherein his complaint was particularly 
defective and advised him as to what allegation was necessary 
to cure it. 
AUTHORITIES 
· That the plaintiff could have requested leave to amend 
. his pleadings iri time before the entry of the formal judgment 
is apparent from the decisio~s of this Court. ·In the case of 
Hancock vs. Luke, .148 P. 456, in an opinion written by Justice 
Frick, the Court said: 
·t, t * Certainly no judgment had been formally 
rendered at the time, and of course none could have 
been. entered, as the· colloquy between the Court and 
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counsel shows. Why, then, was the offer to amend 
not timely? In case pleadings are assailed, must a 
party move to amend before he is apprised of what the 
ruling of the court will be? We think not. We are 
of the opinion, therefore, that the motion for leave 
to amend was timely. * * * * " 
That it is not error to stop a case and dismiss the action 
where no request to amend the pleadings is made notwith-
standing a cause of action might have been alleged is the 
holding of the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Stewart 
vs. Phoenix National Bank, 64 P. 2d 108. The court said: 
" * * * Since it appears that the complaint did not 
state a cause of action, the trial court, when it became 
convinced of that fact, was justified in stopping ·the 
trial at any stage of the case. It is true that, had plaintiff 
at this time asked leave to amend his complaint, it 
would have been reversible error to refuse to grant 
such leave, but apparently there was no request there-
for. We can surmise from the pleadings that perhaps 
a cause of action might have been stated which, if 
proved by plaintiff's evidence to the satisfaction of 
the triers of fact, would have sustained a judgment in 
his favor, but we are bound by the rules of law, and 
must apply them to the record before us, and not to the 
record as it might have existed. Since the complaint, 
taken into consideration with the record of the mort-
gage foreclosure suit, of which the court properly took 
judicial notice, did not state a cause of action, and 
since there was no request for leave to amend it, 
judgment was correctly rendered in favor of defendant" 
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The California Court m the case of Watts vs. Currie, 
101 P. 2d 764, said: 
" * * * If the facts warranted, the complaint doubtless 
could have been amended so as to obtain the benefit 
of the extension of time afforded by the Moratorium 
Act. But no claim is made by appellants that they 
asked or made any attempt to amend after the court 
ruled on the demurrer; and the law was well settled 
at the time this action was pending that where a 
defective complaint could be cured by amendment, 
the fact that the demurrer was sustained without leave 
to amend does not constitute reversible error in the 
absence of a request or application by a plaintiff for such 
permission. Haddad v. McDowell, 213 Cal. 690, 3 
P.2d 550." 
To the same effect is the Supreme Court of Idaho, for 
in the case of Durant vs. Snyder, 151 P. 2d 776, the Court 
said: 
"It is necessary that proper showing be made and that 
the application is made within a reasonable time before 
denial of the application for amendment becomes an 
abuse of discretion * * *" 
To the same effect, also, see: 
Meyer vs. Board of Public Works of City of Los 
Angeles, et. al, 125 P. 2d. 50; Gomes vs. Warn et. al, 
91 P. 2d. 214; Vilardo vs. Sacramento County, 129 P. 
2d. 165. 
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WHEREFORE, it is submitted that a rehearing should 
be granted, that the errors herein complained of be corrected, 
and that the order of this Court reversing the judgment of 
dismissal and remanding the cause for a new trial be vacated 
and set aside, and the judgment of the lower court be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Attot·neys for Defendant and Respondent. 
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